The section has two paragraphs and they do different work. Paragraph (a) imposes the duty: due diligence in preparing or assisting in the preparation of, approving and filing returns, documents, affidavits and other papers relating to Internal Revenue Service matters, and in determining the correctness of oral or written representations made to the Treasury Department and to clients. Paragraph (b) then softens it in one defined situation. "Except as modified by §§10.34 and 10.37, a practitioner will be presumed to have exercised due diligence for purposes of this section if the practitioner relies on the work product of another person and the practitioner used reasonable care in engaging, supervising, training, and evaluating the person, taking proper account of the nature of the relationship between the practitioner and the person."
Every operative term in that presumption is addressed to a human being. Engaging, supervising, training and evaluating are things done to people, and "the nature of the relationship between the practitioner and the person" is a professional relationship, not a licence agreement. Read against a language model the words either have no referent or acquire a technical sense the drafters plainly did not intend — a practitioner does not train the model, and evaluating it is not the same act as evaluating a preparer. The presumption is therefore unavailable, and paragraph (a) sits on the practitioner undiluted.
The consequence is a split that most practices have not noticed. A practitioner who passes a draft return to a junior and reviews it has a presumption available, provided the engagement, supervision and evaluation of that junior were carried out with reasonable care. A practitioner who passes the same work to a tool has no presumption at all and must show the diligence directly, on the return in front of them. That is a heavier record, not a lighter one, and it runs in the opposite direction to the reason the tool was bought. The ethics code reaches a comparable conclusion by a different route, requiring a judgement about what verification a given use of technology needs rather than allowing a standing assumption: see using the output of technology.
Two boundaries keep the page honest. Paragraph (b) opens "Except as modified by §§10.34 and 10.37", so written advice is governed separately and the presumption cannot be borrowed across into it. And Circular 230 binds a practitioner in practice before the Service; a controller who never files with it is outside this section entirely, whatever their tooling. Where the same person does both — a finance role in the morning and a return in the afternoon — the diligence standard changes with the work, which is a distinction worth writing into a firm's own procedures rather than leaving to recollection. Competence for the tool itself is a separate provision again: see competence to use an AI tool.